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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.
Appellees are not permitted to raise for the first time on
appeal determinative issues of law which were not presented to the
lower court or relied upon as an initial defense• Appellees herein
have asserted in their brief on appeal for the first time that
Sections

61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18 U.C.A.

1953

(as amended) are

determinative of the issues on appeal. The former relates to the
definition of a "real estate", and the latter to an affirmative
defense which the appellee has not previously asserted.

Those

statutes are not determinative of any issue raised by the appeal,
and do not relate to any factual or legal matters presented in the
lower court.

Those arguments raised for the first time on appeal

should accordingly be disregarded as untimely.
POINT II.
Although the trial court did not specifically state in its
bench

ruling

that

the April

22, 1983

letter

agreement

was

"ambiguous", the lower court did indicate that certain critical
portions of the agreement were illegible and that the meaning was
unclear.

Under

Utah

law, a

contract

is considered

to be

"ambiguous" where, because of uncertain meaning of terms, missing
terms, or other facial deficiencies, its meaning is unclear.

1

The lower court determined the wording of the April 22, 1983,
letter agreement was insufficient to satisfy the "requirements of
a brokerage agreement" or the "Statute of Frauds"; since it did not
"spell out" anything as far as the terms; and it is appellant's
position that parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties1
intent and thereby the meaning of the agreement.

The Statute of

Frauds does not require that the "note or memorandum" be clear or
unambiguous, but only that it exist.

For the trial court to

conclude as it did that the written agreement did not constitute
a brokerage agreement or satisfy the Statute of Frauds because its
meaning was unclear to the court is manifest error.
POINT III.
Under general contract principles, where fulfillment of a
contract is dependant upon the act or consent of a third person
which

is not

forthcoming, the

contract

cannot

be

enforced.

Appellant asserts that approval by a third person of the parties1
later agreement of May 31, 1984 was in fact an unsatisfied
condition precedent to that agreement, and that failure to satisfy
the condition renders the agreement unenforceable by either party.
Since there existed at the time of the unenforceable May 31, 1984,
agreement a prior commission agreement, it is his position that
appellant became entitled to the payment of a commission upon
performance, which was complete.
2

The lower court erroneously

failed to consider available evidence of the parties1 intent in
connection with either the earlier or the later agreement.

Such

evidence, if considered, would have made their meaning clear.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
MATTERS NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
It is well settled that matters which are not raised in the
lower court may not be presented for the first time on appeal.
Progressive Acquisition v. Lvtle,

P.2d

, 154 Utah Adv. Rep.

31 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co.,
659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799
(Utah App. 1987).
Appellees have raised for the first time in their responsive
brief arguments under Sections 61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18, Utah Code
Annotated, (1953, as amended) claiming that the provisions of those
statutes are determinative.

Since appellees have not previously

raised those issues in the lower court, under Utah law they are now
untimely.
Appellees' argument under sections 61-2-2(8) and 61-2-18
appears to raise a new affirmative defense, which is essentially
that if appellant is to be considered a real estate broker then he

3

is

estopped

from

maintaining

an

action

for

recovery

of

a

commission. Appellees1 other new argument is that appellant is not
a proper party to this action; a defense which was not raised or
ruled upon previously.

Appellees are precluded by Utah law from

raising either of those arguments at this stage of the proceedings.
Appellees1 requested interpretation of the cited statutes, which
may or may not have been found meritorious below, is beyond the
scope of this appeal, and should not be considered in deciding upon
the propriety of the lower court's action.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT CONSIDERED THE APRIL 22, 1983
LETTER TO BE UNCLEAR AND UNINTELLIGIBLE
Appellees argue that the lower court did not find as a matter
of law that ambiguity existed in the April 22, 1983, letter
agreement; but found only that it was insufficient as a brokerage
agreement to satisfy the Statute of Frauds since the "essential
terms" for the payment of a commission were missing. Although the
lower court did not specifically state in its bench ruling that it
found the agreement to be "ambiguous", there is no other or better
meaning to be derived from the court's observations regarding its
attempts to read and understand the language of the agreement.
This court has previously held that "[0]nly when contract
terms are complete, clear, and unambiguous can they be interpreted

4

by the judge on a motion for summary judgment.

Colonial Leasing

v. Larson Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)(citing Morris v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201
(Utah 1983)). If the evidence concerning the terms of an agreement
is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms of the
agreement is a matter to be determined by a jury. Colonial Leasing
at 488 (emphasis added).
Appellees argue that the trial court correctly determined that
the April 22, 1983, letter agreement was insufficient since the
"essential terms" for the payment of a commission were missing.
Appellant maintains that since the trial court determined that
certain "essential" terms were unclear and unintelligible, the
agreement must therefore be considered as "ambiguous" to that
extent; thereby reguiring resort to extrinsic or parol evidence to
determine the parties1 intent, and precluding summary judgment.
Appellees would have this court to conclude as a matter of law
that if a written contract is presented to a court for interpretation and the court cannot read or understand the content thereof
because it is illegible, incomplete, or poorly written, both
parties are precluded from enforcing the contract regardless what
their intent may have been.

Such a result would conceivably

encourage contract draftsmen to prepare unclear or poorly written
documents with a view to later avoidance of enforceability.
5

The language of a written document is considered to be
ambiguous if the words used may be understood to support two or
more plausible meanings. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv.
Rep. 28, 31 (Ct.App. 1990).

The Utah Supreme Court in Faulkner v.

Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983) held that when a contract is
ambiguous because of "uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms,
or other facial deficiencies", parol evidence is admissible to
explain the parties1 intent.1

The facts of this case appear to

fall squarely within the Faulkner holding, since according to the
trial

court's bench

ruling, this contract

leaves

the court

uncertain as to the meaning of its terms, has missing terms, and
several other facial deficiencies. The agreement in this case must
therefore be considered "ambiguous".
The

trial

court's

bench

ruling

in

this

case

clearly

illustrates its inability to comprehend the parties' intent from
the language of the April 22, 1983, letter agreement.

Whether an

ambiguity exists is a question of law to be decided before parol
evidence may be admitted, and the trial court's bench ruling can
only be read as recognizing ambiguity. As this court stated in Big
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 1977):
[T]he court should first examine the language of the
instruments and accord to it the weight and effect which
1

Grow v. Marwick Development, Inc., 621 P.2d 1249 (Utah

1980).
6

it nay show was intended and if the meaning is ambiguous
or uncertain then consider parol evidence of the parties'
intentions.
Of course, a motion for summary judgment may not be
granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an
ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual
issue as to what the parties intended. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 691.
The

trial

court's

comments

demonstrates the ambiguity.

in

its

bench

ruling

clearly

They include the following:

And of course as I was able to read it myself, which
I could not make it all out. (Record at 00107, page 4)
(emphasis added)
I am not persuaded that either the wording in paragraph
6 or the wording in the Form A is sufficient of a
brokerage agreement to satisfy that a commission would
be paid upon the broker finding a willing and able buyer.
I don't think it's sufficient writing to meet that
requirement and must be in writing under the Statute of
Frauds. That it does not spell out anything really as
far as the terms. (Record at 00107, page 4) (emphasis
added)
I am of the opinion that the wording in the April 22nd
letter and the Form A is not sufficient to spell out that
anything was going to be paid regardless of what took
place. I think the parties came down to it, that they
did negotiate, and there may have been some misunderstanding as far as what was supposed to be paid by [sic]
Mr.Florence. (Record at 00107, page 5)(emphasis added)
I don't think the letter of April 22nd or anything
in Form A says [sic] the requirement of the law of the
Statute of Frauds or the requirement as far as what must
be in writing for a brokerage. (Record at 00107, page 5)
The trial court by its comments made a legal conclusion that
the contract's meaning was by its terms "ambiguous" or "uncertain",

7

since the document itself presented "uncertain meaning of terms,
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies".

Any one of those

conclusions would legally preclude summary judgment; yet the trial
court

ironically

uncertainties

and

granted

summary

without

any

judgment

attempt

to

because
resolve

of

the

them

by

considering available extrinsic evidence or allowing the factual
issue to be decided by a jury.
An ambiguity obviously exists in paragraph six (6) of the
April 22, 1983, agreement pertaining to the $200,000.00 annuity,
which was not a part of the purchase price and could have no other
purpose than as a commission.

The trial court correctly observed

that "this was a critical situation", but followed that observation
with a comment that the court "could not make it all out." (Record
at 00107 pp. 4-5)

In other words, understanding the meaning of

paragraph 6 was considered critical to understanding the object of
the $200,000 annuity, but the critical paragraph of the agreement
was illegible. Standing alone, paragraph six (6) of the agreement
has no apparent meaning; yet it must mean something or the parties
would not have written it into their agreement.
erroneously

made no effort to determine what

The trial court
it meant, and

available extrinsic evidence clearly discloses its meaning.

8

POINT III.
UNDER CONTRACT LAW, FAILURE TO PERFORM A
CONDITION PRECEDENT RENDERS CONTRACT UNENFORCEABLE
Appellees argue in Point II of their response that failure to
satisfy the third-party approval condition precedent contained in
the

May

31, 1984, letter

release had

no bearing

transaction contemplated between the parties.

upon

the

Appellees have

provided no authority to support their argument that failure to
obtain third party approval as a condition precedent to an
agreement does not effect its validity.
The law of contracts is well settled regarding such conditions
precedent and the necessity of satisfying them before the agreement
becomes enforceable.2

The Restatement of Contracts

(Second)

Section 225 states the general rule as follows:
Performance of a duty subject to a condition cannot
become due unless the condition occurs or its nonoccurrence is excused.
Unless it has been excused, the non-occurrence of a
condition discharges the duty when the condition can no
longer occur. (Emphasis added)
The second paragraph of the May 31, 1984 agreement specifically creates a condition precedent to the entire May 31, 1984
agreement, which it is undisputed never occurred.

Again, that

paragraph provides:

17 Am. Jur.2d Contracts, Section 320 et.seq (1964).
9

"This agreement is subject to approval of Mr. Joseph
Henroid of the law firm of Nielson and Senior of Salt
Lake City, Utah, particularly in regard to that certain
court order of approximately October 1983 regarding the
divorce of Giles H. and Ululani Florence." (Emphasis
added)
Appellees argue that there was no necessity for any action by
Mr. Henroid because the underlying transaction itself never closed.
The obvious flaw in that position is that the approval did not
relate to the closing, but to the agreement as a whole.

The

reguirement was for approval of the entire agreement, unrelated to
the closing.

Both the approval of Mr. Henroid and failure of the

closing were of course events beyond the control of appellant.
The basic objective in construing any contract must be to give
effect to the intentions of the parties.

If possible, those

intentions must be determined from an examination of the text of
the agreements. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P. 2d 225, 229
(Utah 1987); DuBois v. Nve, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978); Qberhansly
v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977).

It is apparent in this case

that the trial court failed to view the two written documents as
a whole, or harmonize them if possible.

Upon finding that

uncertainties existed, the trial court failed to consider available
evidence of the parties1 intent outside the four corners of the
ambiguous April 22, 1983 agreement; and without the benefit of such
available illumination held the agreement to be unenforceable. The

10

trial court then suggested that if there were an enforceable
brokerage agreement the May 31, 1984 release agreement would apply,
erroneously failing to recognize the significance of a failed
condition precedent to that later agreement. In both respects, the
lower court erred.
It is apparent from viewing both agreements as a whole that
there was a commission to be paid appellant. What remain unclear
are the details of the parties1 intentions.

It is illogical that

the appellant would agree to reduce his commission unless he was
motivated by appellees' assurances that the transaction would
proceed to a closing.

If the appellees' position were to be

accepted by this court, the result would be to reward a party who
unjustifiably fails to close after full performance by another.
As was noted by this court in Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, at
230

(Utah 1987),

activity".

"such a holding would

encourage

fraudulent

Such conduct toward brokers who are lured into

subsequent agreements assuring payment upon closing which the
obligated

party

secretly

intends

not

to

conclude

would

be

tantamount to fraud, and certainly contrary to public policy. The
trial court has totally failed to consider the parties1 intent in
entering

into

the

agreements, and

reversible error.

11

that

failure

constitutes

CONCLUSION
Appellees argue that the undisputed facts demonstrate that
Appellant is not entitled to prevail on this appeal.

Appellees1

argument fails for the obvious reason that the trial court did not
consider either the undisputed facts, or any of the facts which
remain in dispute.

The trial court determined that the April 22,

1983, letter agreement was unclear because the document was not
legible and lacked certain clarifying terms, while failing to
consider available parol evidence of the parties1 intent.

If the

court had properly considered that evidence and attempted to
harmonize both agreements as a whole, it would have been compelled
to recognize the existence of an enforceable agreement, or at the
very least, genuine issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment.

The uncertainties described in the trial court's bench

ruling are, in and of themselves, sufficient to preclude summary
j udgment.
The intent of the parties is a matter for the fact finder to
consider, and is not a question of law.

The gravamen of this

appeal involves public policy which should be to protect not only
brokers but others who have fully performed under agreements
entitling them to compensation from loss through the unscrupulous
actions of a buyer who inexcusably refuses to perform.
Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court's action be
12

reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings as required
by Utah law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~ /

day of June, 1991.
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